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Abstract
This paper analyzes the eﬃciency of risk-taking decisions in an economy that is
prone to systemic risk, captured by ﬁnancial ampliﬁcation eﬀects that occur in response
to strong adverse shocks. It shows that decentralized agents who have unconstrained
access to a complete set of Arrow securities choose to expose themselves to such risk
to a socially ineﬃcient extent because of pecuniary externalities that are triggered
during ﬁnancial ampliﬁcation. The paper develops an externality pricing kernel that
quantiﬁes the state-contingent magnitude of such externalities and provides welfare-
theoretic foundations for macro-prudential policy measures to correct the distortion.
Furthermore, it derives conditions under which agents employ ex-ante risk markets to
fully undo any expected government bailout. Finally, it ﬁnds that constrained market
participants face socially insuﬃcient incentives to raise more capital during episodes of
ﬁnancial ampliﬁcation.
JEL Codes: E44, G13, G18, D62, H23
Keywords: ﬁnancial ampliﬁcation, systemic risk, systemic externalities,
externality pricing kernel, macroprudential regulation, bailout neutrality5
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Non-technical Summary 
In the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, economists, policymakers and society at large have 
sought to understand why the global financial system had allocated risks so poorly that the decline of 
housing prices led to massive financial disruption. This happened despite a widespread belief that 
financial innovation in the decade before the crisis had led to an unprecedented ability of spreading risk 
to those agents in the economy that were most capable of bearing it. 
Our paper contributes to answering this question by showing that financial market participants 
generically find it optimal to take on an excessive amount of systemic risk. We describe systemic risk as 
the danger of economy-wide financial feedback effects whereby adverse economic shocks force market 
participants to sell assets in order to raise liquidity, and the sales in turn push down asset prices and 
force them to sell even more of their asset holdings. On the productive side of the economy, this is 
mirrored in declines in output. 
In such a situation, individual market participants rationally take the prevailing level of asset prices as 
given and do not internalize that their fire sales in aggregate contribute to the asset price declines. As a 
result of this externality, individual market participants take on excessive systemic risks. Even though 
they may have access to a complete market to insure against systemic risk, they insure to a socially 
inefficient extent because when they trade off the costs and benefits of insurance, they do not 
internalize the social benefits of insurance in the form of mitigating the economy-wide fire sales. By 
contrast, a policymaker has the capacity to internalize this externality and make everybody better off by 
inducing financial market participants to reduce their systemic risk-taking. This in turn will lead to lower 
fire sales, smaller price declines and greater macroeconomic stability.  
Our paper develops the concept of an externality pricing kernel that can be used to price the 
externalities imposed by risky investments and that provides a theoretical basis for macroprudential 
capital adequacy requirements to regulate systemic risk-taking. Furthermore, it derives a bailout 
neutrality result, i.e. it gives conditions under which market participants who have access to complete 
financial markets will employ these markets to fully undo any expected government bailout by simply 
increasing their exposure to those risks that they expect to be bailed out.   
Finally, the paper finds that the externalities that lead to excessive systemic risk-taking also imply that 
market participants face socially insufficient incentives to raise more capital when they suffer losses 
during episodes of systemic risk. This provides a theoretical rationale for compulsory recapitalizations.  
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1 Introduction
This paper develops a simple model of systemic risk in the form of ﬁnancial ampliﬁcation
eﬀects that arise in response to strong adverse shocks. Risk-neutral bankers raise ﬁnance
from households and invest in risky projects. When the aggregate return on the projects is
low, their liquid net worth is insuﬃcient to meet the contracted repayments and ﬁnancial
constraints force them to engage in ﬁre sales, i.e. they sell some of the projects at a price
that is below their marginal product. This triggers ﬁnancial ampliﬁcation eﬀects: the more
bankers sell, the larger the decline in asset prices and the lower the amount of liquidity they
raise from a given amount of sales, requiring in turn further sales to meet a given repayment
obligation (see ﬁgure 1). We characterize the resulting downward spiral in the economy as
systemic risk.1
Ex ante, the privately optimal ﬁnancial contract for bankers trades oﬀ the eﬃciency
cost of ﬁre sales against the premium demanded by households for taking on aggregate
risk. Individual bankers do not internalize their contribution to aggregate price declines and
therefore impose pecuniary externalities on each other when they engage in ﬁre sales. This
induces them to take on socially excessive systemic risk in their ex ante ﬁnancing decisions.2
We employ our model to shed light on a number of policy issues that have been debated in
the aftermath of the recent ﬁnancial crisis:
First, we develop a theoretical framework of macro-prudential regulation that induces
individual bankers to internalize their contribution to systemic risk. We characterize an ex-
ternality pricing kernel that captures the state-contingent magnitude of systemic externalities
and that can be used to price the externalities imposed by ﬁnancial claims or real investment
opportunities. In states when ﬁnancial constraints are loose, the externality kernel is zero;
in constrained states the externality kernel captures the social cost of ampliﬁcation eﬀects
created by a unit payoﬀ. A policymaker who charges a Pigovian tax to oﬀset the external-
ities or imposes equivalent regulatory measures on bankers can restore constrained Pareto
eﬃciency in the economy.
1This is in accordance with the description of systemic risk by the Bank for International Settlements: ex-
ogenous shocks to ﬁnancial institutions that have common risk exposure are endogenously ampliﬁed because
of wide-spread ﬁnancial distress (see e.g. Borio, 2003, for a discussion).
2There is a clear analogy to more traditional forms of externalities: for example, an entrepreneur who
creates pollution derives private beneﬁts from his activities, but society at large bears some of the costs. In
our example, a banker who exposes himself to the risk of ﬁre-sales obtains higher proﬁts in good states of
nature, but the economy at large suﬀers from the ampliﬁcation eﬀects that are triggered by ﬁre-sales in bad
states of nature. If he limited his risk-taking, he would bear all the costs in terms of foregone proﬁts, but
the economy at large would beneﬁt from the mitigation of ﬁre sales and from greater ﬁnancial stability.7
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Figure 1: Financial ampliﬁcation under binding ﬁnancial constraints
Second, we derive a bailout neutrality result: we show that unregulated bankers will
employ ex-ante risk markets to fully undo any expected lump-sum government transfer that
aims to mitigate ﬁnancial ampliﬁcation eﬀects. Undoing such transfers is optimal for bankers
since the equilibrium with excessive systemic risk constitutes their private optimum.
Third, we ﬁnd that individual bankers undervalue the social beneﬁts of raising capital
during systemic crises because they do not internalize the positive eﬀects of reducing their
ﬁre sales on the rest of the banking system. This provides a policy rationale for mandatory
capital injections.
Our paper also illustrates the conceptual diﬀerence between systematic risk and systemic
risk: Bankers in our model are always subject to systematic risk (i.e. to aggregate, undiver-
siﬁable market risk). However, systemic risk only arises when the banking sector as a whole
experiences binding ﬁnancial constraints and ﬁnancial ampliﬁcation eﬀects are triggered.
The setting in which we describe our results is an economy with three time periods
t =0 ,1,2 and two types of agents, bankers and households. The economy experiences an
aggregate shock that is realized at the beginning of period 1. Bankers are risk-neutral and
raise ﬁnance in a complete market of Arrow securities in period 0 for a lumpy investment
project that yields a risky payoﬀ in period 1 and a safe payoﬀ in period 2. As in Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997), we assume that ﬁnancial promises need to be secured and that bankers
can use the asset value of the project as collateral, but not the contemporary return.3 This
implies that bankers do have collateral to back up the Arrow securities due in period 1, but
they cannot commit to repayments in period 2 since the asset value of all projects is zero in
the ﬁnal period – no borrowing between periods 1 and 2 can be sustained. However, bankers
can raise ﬁnance in period 1 by selling a fraction of their projects at the prevailing market
price to the household sector. In period 2, bankers consume the payoﬀ on their remaining
3Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), building on Hart and Moore (1994), motivate this by observing that the
owners of a project could threaten to withdraw their labor and thereby destroy the contemporary return.8
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asset holdings and perish.
Households come in two generations. First-generation households live from period 0 to
1 and provide ﬁnance to bankers in the market for Arrow securities. They are risk-averse so
their demand for securities contingent on a particular state of nature is downward-sloping.
This makes it costly for bankers to share risk with them. Second-generation households are
risk-neutral, live from period 1 to 2 and have access to a technology that employs the assets
of bankers but that is less productive and subject to decreasing returns-to-scale. Therefore
the asset demand of second-generation households is downward-sloping, and it is costly for
bankers to sell assets.
If the initial investment requirement of bankers is suﬃciently small, they promise a ﬁxed
payment to ﬁrst-generation households, which they ﬁnance from their period 1 payoﬀ. They
absorb all aggregate risk and do not engage in ﬁre sales in period 1. In this case the
decentralized equilibrium in the economy is socially eﬃcient.
For a larger initial investment requirement, the period 1 payoﬀ of bankers in low states of
nature does not allow them to make a ﬁxed payment to ﬁrst-generation households without
engaging in costly asset sales. Bankers therefore need to ﬁnd the optimal trade-oﬀ between
costly risk sharing with ﬁrst-generation households and asset sales at a price below their
marginal product to second-generation households.
Our main result is that bankers in the decentralized equilibrium of the described economy
insure too little in ex ante risk markets and engage in excessive ﬁre sales in ex post asset
markets once an adverse shock has materialized. The reason for this distortion is that
atomistic bankers take prices in the economy as given and do not internalize the pecuniary
externalities that their ﬁre sales give rise to. Under complete markets pecuniary externalities
do not have eﬃciency implications because the relative marginal valuations of all goods
among all agents in the economy are equated so that a redistribution cannot achieve a
Pareto improvement. In the described setting, by contrast, binding ﬁnancial constraints
imply that bankers value productive assets more highly than households. A constrained
social planner internalizes that reducing ﬁre sales keeps asset prices more elevated, which
mitigates the ﬁnancial constraints on bankers. (By contrast, atomistic bankers just take
asset prices as given.) Therefore the planner engages in more ex ante insurance and fewer
ﬁre sales than decentralized agents.
Our ineﬃciency result relies crucially on the assumption that bankers cannot borrow
against the payoﬀs of their asset holdings in the ﬁnal period. Otherwise bankers would be
the natural holders of all assets, since they have the most productive technology to operate
them, ﬁre sales would not occur, and the equilibrium would be eﬃcient. Furthermore, our
ﬁnding relies on the assumption that second-generation households are not alive in period9
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0 and cannot provide risk-neutral insurance in that period. Otherwise bankers in period 0
would fully insure against having to engage in ﬁre sales in period 1 and would achieve a
Pareto eﬃcient allocation.
Literature Our work builds on the literature on ﬁnancial ampliﬁcation and ﬁre sales
as described by Fisher (1933), Bernanke and Gertler (1990), Shleifer and Vishny (1997)
or Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Speciﬁcally, our model is a simpliﬁed version of Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997). In this literature, it is common to assume that ﬁnancially constrained
bankers/entrepreneurs only have access to uncontingent forms of ﬁnance. If they had access
to complete and risk-neutral insurance markets, bankers/entrepreneurs would fully insure
against the risk of becoming constrained and no ﬁnancial ampliﬁcation eﬀects would occur
in case of adverse shocks (Krishnamurthy, 2003). This paper shows that risk aversion among
the providers of ﬁnance is suﬃcient to break this result, as bankers trade oﬀ the costs of
binding ﬁnancial constraints and of purchasing insurance and choose an interior optimum.
The paper also builds on the literature on the generic ineﬃciency of the decentralized
equilibrium under incomplete markets (Hart, 1975; Stiglitz, 1982; Geanakoplos and Pole-
marchakis, 1986), which includes more recent seminal contributions by Gromb and Vayanos
(2002), Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2003) and Lorenzoni (2008). Gromb and Vayanos
(2002) analyze ﬁnancially constrained arbitrageurs and show that they generally fail to en-
gage in the socially eﬃcient amount of arbitrage between two risky assets because they do
not internalize the pecuniary externalities involved in ﬁre sales when ﬁnancial constraints
are binding. Aside from the two risky assets, arbitrageurs in their model only have access
to uncontingent bonds.
In Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2003) and Lorenzoni (2008), entrepreneurs raise ﬁ-
nance for a risky investment project in a risk-neutral security market and face the risk of
binding ﬁnancial constraints in a subsequent period. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2003)
investigate the ﬁnancing and investment decisions in a small open emerging economy in
which binding future constraints result in exchange rate depreciations. Lorenzoni (2008)
focuses on the aggregate level of investment in a simpliﬁed Kiyotaki-Moore economy similar
to ours, in which binding constraints lead to ﬁre sales and asset price declines. In both
works, entrepreneurs engage in excessive investment because of pecuniary externalities that
arise from future binding constraints.
However, their results rely on the assumption that binding ﬁnancial constraints in the
initial security market prevent optimal insurance against future shocks: in Caballero and
Krishnamurthy (2003), entrepreneurs would like to commit to higher repayments in good
states of nature, but limited collateral prevents them from doing so; in Lorenzoni (2008),
entrepreneurs would like to purchase more insurance against low states of nature, but limited10
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commitment prevents the sellers of insurance from providing it.4
In our paper, by contrast, bankers have access to a complete and unconstrained Arrow
security market in the inital period, which they can use to share risk with risk-averse house-
holds. The explicit focus on the unconstrained trade-oﬀ between risk and return makes
our framework well suited for studying optimal risk-taking and price-based macropruden-
tial regulation of systemic externalities. Furthermore, we present a number of additional
new results, including on the ex-ante eﬀects of bailout transfers and on the incentives for
constrained bankers to raise new capital.
A number of recent empirical papers document the importance of ﬁnancial ampliﬁcation
eﬀects. For example, Adrian and Brunnermeier (2008) show that VaR – a measure for
the riskiness of a ﬁnancial institution’s assets – rises strongly when another institution is
in distress. They also document that ﬁnancial institutions that increase their exposure to
systemic risk raise their expected return, consistent with our theoretical model. Adrian and
Shin (2010) ﬁnd that leverage among investment banks is strongly pro-cyclical, implying
that they take on more risk in good times and sell oﬀ risky assets in bad times. Benmelech
and Bergman (2011) provide evidence for ﬁre-sale externalities in the airline sector.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The following section describes our model
setup. Section 3 analyzes the decentralized equilibrium of the economy and the dynamics of
ﬁnancial ampliﬁcation when ﬁnancing constraints are binding. Section 4 analyzes the social
eﬃciency of the decentralized equilibrium and presents a new framework of macroprudential
regulation. In section 5 we study extensions of our baseline model to develop our results
on bailout neutrality and on the incentives for raising capital. Section 6 concludes. The
appendix contains a detailed discussion of some of the technical assumptions and proofs of
our model.
2M o d e l
Our model economy consists of three time periods t =0 ,1,2 and is inhabited by two cat-
egories of atomistic agents, bankers and households. Banking entrepreneurs represent the
consolidated productive sector of the economy and could alternatively be interpreted as en-
trepreneurs – the important characteristic is that they make ﬁnancing decisions and are
subject to business risk and ﬁnancial constraints. We will call them in short “bankers.”
4One important implication of this setup is that suﬃcient provision of public liquidity would address the
imperfections in the security market and would restore constrained social eﬃciency as in Holmstr¨ om and
Tirole (1998). This would not help in our setup.11
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Households come in two generations; they are less productive than bankers, but they receive
endowments and therefore have the ability to provide ﬁnance to bankers. There are two
types of goods, a homogeneous consumption good and a productive asset. In period 1, a
random state of nature ω ∈ Ω is realized, where Ω is a set of all possible outcomes. The
productivity of bankers’ assets in period 1 is given by a random variable Aω
1, which is con-
tinuously distributed over the interval [Amin,A max] ⊆ R+ with density function g(A), and
which satisﬁes the normalization E [Aω
1]= ¯ A1 =1 .







where we use the subindex ‘b’ for banker-speciﬁc consumption variables. In period 0, they
have access to a lumpy investment technology that allows them to invest αt1 consumption
goods and obtain t1 units of productive capital goods. We can think of this as planting a seed
that costs α on t1 units of land each. (We will discuss a generalization of this later.) They
have no endowment, so they need to ﬁnance their period 0 investment by selling ﬁnancial
claims in a complete one-period market of Arrow securities contingent on the state of nature
ω ∈ Ω. We denote the amount to be repaid in state ω of period 1 as bω
1 and the stochastic
discount factor (or pricing kernel) at which the claims are priced in period 0 as mω
1.The
resulting period 0 budget constraint is





In period 1, each unit of the capital good produces a stochastic net dividend Aω
1, which
depends on the state of nature ω,
Bankers are subject to a commitment problem that limits what they can pledge to repay.
Speciﬁcally, we follow Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) in assuming that when they enter ﬁnancial
contracts, they can only pledge the market value but not the dividend income of their asset
holdings next period.5 Since the economy ends after period 2, the asset price ex dividend is
zero in that period and bankers have no collateral to pledge in period 1, i.e. no borrowing
between periods 1 and 2 can be sustained. We therefore set w.l.o.g. bω
2 = 0. Following the
same argument, bankers do have collateral to oﬀer between periods 0 and 1, which they use
to back up their promises bω
1.
In period 1, bankers cannot borrow, but they have access to a market in which they can
trade their productive assets at price qω
1. As we will see below, the asset sales of bankers in
5Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) motivate this by the notion that bankers could threaten to withdraw their
labor in the period in which lenders try to seize the asset, which would destroy all contemporaneous output.12
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this market share certain characteristics of ﬁre-sales; therefore we denote the quantity that
bankers sell as ﬁre-sales fω
1 .
We make two simplifying assumptions, which are formalized in appendix A.1: First we
assume that the collateral of bankers in period 1 is always suﬃcient to back up their optimal
period 0 ﬁnancial promises bω
1. Second, we assume that the initial investment requirement
αt1 is suﬃciently low that bankers’ optimal ﬁre sales satisfy fω
1 ≤ t1∀ω. We can therefore
omit the two constraints on period 0 borrowing and on ﬁre sales from the maximization
problem below. However, note that neither assumption is critical to obtain the basic results
of our paper.
Accounting for the promised repayment bω
1 on the Arrow securities that they issued, the












Given their linear preferences, bankers would like to substitute consumption between
periods 1 and 2 at a rate of unity. We impose a non-negativity constraint on period 1
consumption cω
1,b ≥ 0 to prevent them from using this device to circumvent the borrowing
constraint that they face.
In period 2, bankers employ their remaining asset holdings (t1 − fω
1 ) in production, and
they consume the resulting output cω
2,b = ¯ A2(t1 − fω
1 ), where ¯ A2 > ¯ A1 since period 2 reﬂects














s.t. (2), (3) and c
ω
1,b ≥ 0( 4 )
First-Generation Households We assume that there are two generations of households
that live for two periods each. The ﬁrst generation lives across periods 0 and 1. They are





where u(·) is a standard neo-classical utility function. We use the sub-index ‘h’f o rﬁ r s t -
generation households. They receive an endowment e every period that satisﬁes e>α t 1.I n
period 0 they buy a bundle {bω
1,h} of Arrow securities that oﬀer a contingent repayment bω
1,h
in period 1. Given the stochastic discount factor {mω
1} at which Arrow securities are priced
in the market, the total outlay of ﬁrst generation households in period 0 is E[mω
1bω
1,h].
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Demand for Arrow securities is downward-sloping, implying that dmω
1/dbω
1,h < 0. Further-




1,h > 0. The technical condition for this is listed as assumption A.2 in the
appendix.
Remark: First generation households could alternatively be interpreted as entrepreneurs
who are unconstrained and who have a competing use for funds in a concave production
technology that mirrors the concave utility function of households.
Second-Generation Households Second generation households live from period 1 to









where the sub-index ‘l’ denotes variables of second-generation households. They receive an
endowment e every period and buy fω
1,l productive assets at the given market price qω
1 in
period 1. As in Lorenzoni (2008), they employ their asset holdings in period 2 production
using a decreasing returns-to-scale production function F(·) that satisﬁes F  (0) = ¯ A2 and
F    < 0, i.e. their marginal productivity is equal to the productivity of bankers at zero, but
declines in the amount of assets purchased – households are less productive than bankers for
any positive amount of assets employed.


























Their demand function is downward-sloping, implying that dqω
1/dfω
1,l < 0. Furthermore,
we assume the functional form of F(·) and the parameters of the model are such that the




1,l > 0. The
technical condition for this is described in assumption A.3 in the appendix.
The strictly monotonic relationship between the quantity f of assets purchased and the
amount spent on such purchases s = f · q = f · F  (f) allows us to deﬁne a function f(s)14
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that expresses the amount of asset purchases resulting from an amount s ≥ 0s p e n to ns u c h
purchases as the implicit solution to
s = f(s) · F
 (f(s)) (9)
For later use, we deﬁne f(s)=0f o rs<0. We denote the corresponding asset price function
q(s)=F  (f(s)). If bankers ﬁre-sell all their productive assets, the asset price declines to
qmin = F  (t1) and they could raise a maximum amount
s
max = t1q
min = t1 · F
 (t1)
The functions f(s)a n dq(s) are therefore both deﬁned over the interval (−∞,s max]. For non-
positive values of s ≤ 0 they return f(s)=0a n dq(s)= ¯ A2. For positive values s ∈ (0,s max],
f(s) increases in a convex manner from 0 to t1 and q(s) decreases from ¯ A2 to qmin.
The magnitude smax also represents what ﬁrst-generation households could obtain if they
seize all t1 assets from bankers in period 1 and re-sell them to second-generation households.
Remark: In the described setup, the demand of second-generation households for pro-
ductive assets is downward-sloping because their production technology exhibits decreasing
returns to scale. We could obtain similar results if they had concave utility u(·) and a linear
production technology ¯ A2f. In that case asset demand would be deﬁned by the optimality
condition q = ¯ A2 ·
u(e+ ¯ A2f)
u(e−qf) and would be downward-sloping because households dislike an
unsmooth consumption proﬁle.
3 Decentralized Equilibrium















1) which satisfy the maximization problems (4), (5), (7) of all three agents
as well as the market-clearing conditions for Arrow securities bω
1 = bω




3.1 Backward Induction: Period 1 Equilibrium
We solve the problem of bankers by backward induction: we ﬁrst analyze their optimal
period 1 and 2 allocations, given that the state of the world ω is realized at the beginning
of period 1; then we proceed to solve for the optimal ﬁnancing decision in period 0.
After the productivity shock ω has been realized, denote by V (aω) the utility that a
banker obtains from his net liquid asset holdings aω = Aω
1t1 − bω
1 in the beginning of period15
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1. We denote the Lagrangian of the associated optimization problem as follows. (Since there
are no further shocks after period 1, we drop the superscript ω for ease of notation.)
V (a)= m a x
{c1,b,f1}
c1,b + ¯ A2(t1 − f1) − μ[c1,b − a − q1f1]+λc1,b (10)
The ﬁrst order conditions are
FOC(c1,b): μ =1+λ
FOC(f1): ¯ A2 = μq1
Depending on the amount of initial liquid assets a at the beginning of period 1, we
distinguish two equilibria:
Unconstrained equilibrium for a ≥ 0: For non-negative liquid asset holdings at the
beginning of period 1, the optimum allocation of bankers is unconstrained: they consume
their liquid wealth in period 1 c1,b = a and do not engage in ﬁre sales f1 =0 . I np e r i o d
2, they consume their production c2,b = ¯ A2t1. The shadow prices satisfy μ =1a n dλ =0 .
The allocation f1 = 0 together with a price q1 = ¯ A2 also constitutes an optimum for second
generation households.
Constrained equilibrium for −smax ≤ a<0: For negative liquid asset holdings, i.e.
when the output of bankers in period 1 is insuﬃcient to cover their payment obligation b1,
bankers would like to roll over debt into period 2 but are prevented from doing so by the
binding borrowing constraint. We denote the liquidity shortfall s = −a.B a n k e r s c h o o s e
period 1 consumption c1,b = 0 and engage in asset sales of f(s)a tp r i c eq(s)s oa st oc o v e r
the liquidity shortfall s = q(s)f(s).
In period 2, they consume the output from their remaining asset holdings c2,b = ¯ A2(t1 −
f1). Second-generation households are willing to buy a level f(s) > 0 of assets if the price
declines suﬃciently below ¯ A2 so as meet their optimality condition q1 = F  (f(s)). Since
bankers sell assets at prices that are below their marginal product, we call these sales “ﬁre
sales.” The shadow price of liquidity of bankers is μ = ¯ A2/q > 1, reﬂecting that an additional
unit of liquidity could buy up 1/q assets and earn a return ¯ A2.
Comparative Statics and Ampliﬁcation Eﬀects
Figure 2 depicts a comparative static analysis of the economy’s equilibrium in period 1 for a
ﬁxed repayment obligation ¯ b1. The lower productivity Aω
1, the lower the liquidity of bankers
(left panel). If bankers produce less than the debt level Aω
1t1 < ¯ b1, they experience binding
constraints. As a result, they have to engage in ﬁre sales of some of their productive asset
holdings (center panel), which reduces the equilibrium price q1 (right panel).16
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Figure 2: Fire sales and price declines as a function of Aω
1 for bω
1 = ¯ b1
The eﬀects of shocks under this constrained regime are magniﬁed by ﬁnancial ampliﬁca-
tion: suppose that bankers are constrained, selling f1 to meet their period 1 repayment obli-
gation, and suddenly experience a small shock ds > 0 to their liquidity position. The partial
equilibrium eﬀect is that they are forced to ﬁre-sell an additional ds
q1 of their productive assets.
This sale depresses the price q1 by ds
q1 ·
∂q1
∂f1 < 0. By implication bankers receive ds
q1 ·
∂q1
∂f1 ·f1 < 0










to further price declines ds
q1 ·ηqf ·
∂q1
∂f1, a further reduction in revenues from asset sales, further
ﬁre sales ds









2 and so on. In general equilibrium, the total eﬀect










Note that this expression can also be obtained by implicitly diﬀerentiating equation (9). The
second factor in the expression is (by assumption A.3) always greater than 1 and captures
the eﬀects of ﬁnancial ampliﬁcation.
3.2 Period 0 Financing Decisions
First-generation households consume c0,h = e − αt1 in period 0 and cω
1,h = e + bω
1 in state ω
of period 1. Following optimality condition (6), their pricing kernel mω
1 is a function of the
payment bω






u (e + bω
1)
u (e − αt1)
(12)
The period 0 optimization problem of bankers can be reformulated by employing the
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Assigning a shadow price of ν to the period 0 budget constraint, the ﬁrst-order condition of






Observe that V  (aω)=μω =
¯ A2
q(−a) reﬂects the shadow price of liquidity of bankers in state
ω of period 1, and ν reﬂects the shadow cost of raising funds in period 0.
Substituting for mω
1 according to (12), we deﬁne an optimal repayment function b1(ν;A1)




u (e + b1)
u (e − αt1)
(15)
If the shadow cost ν of raising funds in period 0 is below a threshold ˆ ν(A1)=
u(e−αt1)
u(e+A1t1),
then there are no ﬁre-sales, so q(·)= ¯ A2 and the left-hand side of the equation equals 1. The










Note that over the interval (0, ˆ ν(A1)], the right-hand side of this function is independent of
A1 and is strictly increasing in ν. It satisﬁes limν→0 bunc
1 (ν)=−e and bunc
1 (ˆ ν(A1)) = A1t1.
For ν exceeding the threshold ˆ ν(A1), bankers ﬁnd it optimal to promise a period 1
repayment b1 >A 1t1 that exceeds their asset income, which implies that they must raise
some liquidity through ﬁre-sales to repay ﬁrst-generation households. The left-hand side of
equation (15) is then strictly increasing in b1;f o rb1 = A1t1 it equals 1, and for b1 = A1t1+smax
it is ¯ A2/qmin.
For a given ν, the right-hand side is strictly decreasing in b1 from ∞ for b1 →− e to
0f o rb1 →∞because of the Inada conditions on the utility function of ﬁrst-generation
households. As long as ν ∈ (ˆ ν(A1), ¯ ν(A1)], the equation has a unique solution that satisﬁes
b1(ν;A1) ∈ (A1t1,A 1t1+smax] and that is strictly increasing in both ν and A1. The threshold
value νmax(A1)= ¯ A2/qmin ·
u(e−αt1)
u(e+A1t1+smax) is the maximum shadow price of period 0 liquidity
for which a solution to equation (15) is deﬁned for a given A1 – a higher value of ν would
induce bankers to attempt to raise more liquidity than smax through ﬁre sales, i.e. more than
they can raise given the quantity t1 of assets that they are holding.










The condition ν ≤ ¯ ν(Amin) guarantees that bankers will not attempt to ﬁre sell more assets
than they own in the lowest state of nature, and by implication in all other states of nature.18
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The condition ν ≤ ˆ ν(Amax) implies that bankers will be unconstrained at least in the highest
state of nature, and by implication that there are some states of nature in which they will
not engage in ﬁre-sales.6
In summary, the equilibrium condition (15) deﬁnes a continuous function b1 :( 0 ,νmax]×
[Amin,A max] → (−e,Amint1 + smax] that satisﬁes ∂b1/∂ν > 0a n d∂b1/∂A1 ≥ 0. (Bankers
promise to repay more in a given state ω the tighter the period 0 budget constraint as
captured by ν and the higher the productivity shock Aω
1.)






The function R0 :( 0 ,νmax] → (−e,Rmax
0 ] is continuous and, by assumption A.3, strictly





max) > 0 (18)
By assumption A.1 the initial investment requirement of bankers is low enough to fall within
the deﬁned range of the function αt1 ∈ (0,R max
0 ]. The period 0 budget constraint of bankers
can be written as
R0(ν)=αt1 (19)
The strict monotonicity of R0(·) implies that there is a unique solution ν∗ ∈ (0,νmax]t h a t
satisﬁes this equation. Given the equilibrium ν∗, the optimal borrowing choices of bankers
are b1(ν∗;Aω
1). All other variables follow.
Proposition 1 (Decentralized Equilibrium Under Loose Constraints) If αt1 ∈ [0, ˆ R0]
bankers contract a constant repayment across all states of nature bω
1 = bunc
1 (ν∗) ∀ω, where
the threshold ˆ R0 is deﬁned as






u  (e − αt1)
· A
mint1 (20)
If bankers are unconstrained across all states of nature, they carry all risk and provide
households with a ﬁxed repayment, corresponding to a risk-free bond. This case corresponds
to the lower line bunc
1 (ν∗
II) in ﬁgure 3.
The ceiling ˆ R0 in the proposition captures the amount of period 0 ﬁnance that is raised
by the largest possible ﬁxed payment of bankers Amint1 that avoids binding constraints
and ﬁre sales in the lowest state of nature Amin.N o t e t h a tˆ R0 is higher the greater the
6As we discuss in appendix A.1, it would be straightforward to generalize our focus somewhat, but our
main results would be unaﬀected.19
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Figure 3: Contingent repayment bω
1 for high/low initial investment requirement
minimum period 1 return Amin
1 and the higher the elasticity of substitution of ﬁrst generation
households, since a higher elasticity of substitution implies that households require less
compensation to accept an unsmooth consumption proﬁle.
Proposition 2 (Decentralized Equilibrium Under Partially Binding Constraints)
Otherwise, if αt1 ∈ ( ˆ R0,R max
0 ], then the equilibrium is characterized by a threshold ˆ A1 >A min
such that:
• For Aω
1 ≥ ˆ A1, bankers contract a ﬁxed repayment bω
1 = bunc
1 (ν∗)= ˆ A1t1 ∀ω. Their
consumption is cω
1,b =( Aω
1 − ˆ A1)t1, i.e. they absorb all output risk beyond the threshold
ˆ A1. They engage in no ﬁre sales fω
1 =0 .
• For Aω




1 (ν∗) < ˆ A1t1 and engage in positive ﬁre sales fω
1 > 0. Their period 1
consumption is zero c1,h =0 .
The resulting payment proﬁle is similar to a defaultable bond – bankers pay a ﬁxed repayment
in high states of nature – if their output is suﬃcient to cover the ﬁxed repayment – and the
entire output plus receipts from ﬁre sales in low states of nature when they are in ﬁnancial
distress. This case is illustrated by the upper line bω
1(ν∗
I) in ﬁgure 3.
Ex ante, reducing the repayment bω
1 or engaging in ﬁre sales fω
1 i nl o ws t a t e so fn a t u r ea r e
two alternative costly ways of obtaining liquidity: when bankers engage in ﬁre-sales, asset
prices decline so that their proceeds are less than the marginal product that they could have
earned on the assets. Similarly, the cheapest way for bankers to raise a given amount of
ﬁnance from ﬁrst-generation households is to promise a constant payment across all states
of nature since households are risk-averse. If bankers reduce their promised repayments bω
120
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in low states so as to insure themselves and increase bω
1 in high states of nature to make up
for it, the total interest bill rises. Bankers pick their portfolios such that the relative costs
of the two forms of raising liquidity are equal from their private perspective.
4 Welfare Analysis
In this section, we analyze welfare in the decentralized equilibrium and characterize Pareto-
improving allocations that could be chosen by a planner in the described economy.
4.1 Eﬀects of Marginal Reduction in Fire Sales
Let us ﬁrst analyze the scope for Pareto improvements in the economy by considering the
welfare eﬀects of a marginal reallocation of security issuance that aims at reducing ﬁre sales.
Suppose the economy is in a decentralized equilibrium with partially binding constraints
(as described in proposition 2). Assume there are two states of nature ω,ψ ∈ Ωo fe q u a l
probability density where the period 1 equilibrium in state ω exhibits binding constraints and
in state ψ loose constraints. Consider a planner in period 0 who reduces security issuance of
bankers in the constrained state ω by an inﬁnitesimal amount dbω
1 in period 0 while holding
the prices of Arrow securities constant. In order to satisfy the period 0 budget constraint










> 0. By the envelope theorem, the change in utility of ﬁrst-generation
households is second-order because they were previously at their optimum.
Remark: If we allowed period 0 prices mω
1 and m
ψ
1 of Arrow securities to adjust, then there
would in general be a redistribution of welfare from bankers to households. The planner
could undo this by providing a lump-sum transfer from households to bankers.
In period 1, bankers have dbω
1 more liquid resources in state ω. An atomistic agent who







However, in general equilibrium, the reduction in ﬁre sales pushes up asset prices and leads




















1−ηqf more in period 2 of state ω.21
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Similarly, in state ψ the increase in the promised repayment requires bankers to reduce










1, since bankers in the decentralized








μψ and since μψ = 1 in unconstrained states.







































(Since second generation households purchase assets up to the point where F  (fω
1 )=qω
1,
the welfare eﬀects of the reduction in the quantity of assets used in production are second
order.)
Since μω > 1, the planner could transfer
ηqf
1−ηqfdbω
1 from bankers to second generation
households in the unconstrained state ψ to compensate them for the reallocation in state ω.
This leaves households indiﬀerent and achieves a ﬁrst order welfare gain for bankers. The
described reallocation therefore constitutes a Pareto improvement.
4.2 Planning Problem
Before analyzing the problem more fully, let us note that a planner who has the ability
to arbitrarily redistribute funds between agents in the economy could implement the ﬁrst-
best solution to our probem, in which bankers are always allocated all productive assets in
the economy since they have a superior production technology. In such a setup ﬁnancial
constraints would be irrelevant and the solution is trivial.
In the remainder of this section, we therefore assume that the planner cannot make
transfers to bankers in states of nature when they experience binding constraints. However,
we assume that the planner instead has a regulatory tool to determine the ﬁnancing and
risk-taking decisions bω
1 of bankers in period 0. In addition, she has the means to engage in
lump-sum transfers to ensure that eﬃciency gains are spread around the economy such that
all agents in the economy are (weakly) better oﬀ.22
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where T0 and T ω
1 represent compensatory transfers from bankers to ﬁrst-generation and sec-
ond generation households in periods 0 and 1 respectively. Note that we impose a constraint
T ω
1 ≥ 0, which ensures that the planner uses transfers in period 1 solely for compensatory
reasons – to transfer resources away from bankers to second generation households – and not
to relax the ﬁnancial constraints of bankers by transferring resource to them. UDE and W DE
are the utility levels of ﬁrst and second generation households in the decentralized equilib-
rium of the economy. (In this section, we denote variables that refer to the decentralized
equilibrium with superscript ‘DE’ and – in case of ambiguity – variables that refer to the
social planner’s allocation by ‘SP’.)
Backward Induction: Optimal Period 1 Solution
We ﬁrst focus on a planner who takes as given the net liquid assets a of bankers in a given
state of nature of period 1, after ﬁrst-generation households have been repaid. The planner
maximizes total surplus of bankers and second-generation households over periods 1 and 2
while ensuring that the utility of the latter satisﬁes W ≥ W DE. Since both bankers and
second generation households have linear utility, the planner can transfer resources between
the two at a rate of one for one whenever ﬁnancial constraints are loose. We simplify the
problem in the following way:
Lemma 1 A planner in period 1 can focus on maximizing total surplus S(a) while compen-


























This is feasible as long as the required transfer is less than the total liquid assets of bankers
across all unconstrained states E[max{0,a ω}].
Equation (22) captures that the transfer needs to make up for the loss in utility that second
generation households suﬀer because of reductions in their proﬁts F(f1)−q1f1 from processing23
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ﬁre-sales. Given the linear utility functions of both agents, the precise allocation of transfers
across states of nature is indeterminate – the planner can engage in compensatory transfers
in any unconstrained states as long as the magnitude of the required transfer does not exceed
the expected positive liquid asset holdings of bankers E[max{0,a ω}]. In the following, we
will assume that this condition is met.7
Remark: An alternative speciﬁcation would be to require that the planner’s transfer is
uncontingent T ω
1 = ¯ T1. This would still allow the planner to implement Pareto improvements,
but it would imply that bankers are required to make some transfers in constrained states
of nature even if they have resources available in unconstrained states, which is ineﬃcient.
Using the lemma, we express the planner’s welfare in a given state of period 1 as the sum
of the utility of bankers and second generation households. The solution to this problem
closely reﬂects that of the decentralized period 1 problem of bankers (10) – the planner ﬁnds
it optimal to engage in the minimum amount of ﬁre-sales possible. For a ≥ 0t h e r ea r en o
ﬁre sales (f1 = 0) and total social surplus amounts to a+ ¯ A2t1+2e, where the last two terms
are constants. For a<0, a quantity f1 = f(−a) of assets are ﬁre-sold at price q(−a)a n d
produce output of F(f1) instead of ¯ A2f1. We summarize the planner’s social surplus as a
function of the liquid assets a held by bankers as
S(a)=a + F(f(−a)) − ¯ A2f(−a) + const (23)









¯ A2/q1 − ηqf
1 − ηqf
(24)
where we substituted f  = 1
q1 · 1
1−ηqf from (11). In comparing the marginal valuation of
liquidity of decentralized bankers and of the planner, we ﬁnd
Proposition 3 (Valuation of Liquidity) For a ≥ 0, ﬁnancing constraints are loose and
the valuation of liquidity of decentralized bankers and the planner coincide μSP = μDE =1 .
For a<0, ﬁnancing constraints on bankers are binding, and the planner values liquid-
ity more highly than decentralized agents μSP >μ DE > 1. The private undervaluation of
liquidity is more severe the closer νqf to 1.
7If the expected value of the required transfer is greater than E[max{0,a ω}], then the planner would
instruct bankers to raise a minimum of ¯ s through ﬁre sales in each state of nature and transfer their liquidity
to second generation households, i.e. T ω
1 =m a x {0,a ω +¯ s},w h e r e¯ s is chosen such that resulting revenue
raised satisﬁes equation (22).24
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Figure 4: Private and Social Valuation of Liquidity
Proof. The inequality follows from μDE =
¯ A2
q1 ≥ 1 in the numerator of (24) and from
ηqf < 1, which holds by assumption A.3.
Remark: A planner internalizes that a decline in asset prices leads to ﬁnancial ampliﬁcation
since it reduces the amount of liquidity that bankers can raise from their sales of each unit of
the assets. This pecuniary externality reduces the eﬃciency of the distribution of capital. By
contrast, decentralized bankers take asset prices as given since they realize that the behavior
of an atomistic agent has only an inﬁnitesimal eﬀect on asset prices. This is the basis of the
ineﬃciency result in our paper.
Figure 4 schematically depicts the valuation of liquidity of decentralized agents and the
planner across diﬀerent states of nature assuming a ﬁxed debt level ¯ b1. In normal times
when constraints are loose, the two coincide and equal 1. When ﬁnancing constraints are
binding, μω,SP >μ ω,DE since the planner internalizes that higher liquidity would mitigate
the downward spiral in asset prices and production.
Optimal Period 0 Financing Decisions
Let us now turn to the implications of this diﬀerence in the valuation of liquidity between
planner and decentralized agents for the period 0 allocation of Arrow securities. Having25
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so as to satisfy the remaining two constraints in problem (25).
Normalizing the constraint U ≥ UDE by dividing through the constant u (e − αt1)a n d













(1 − ηqf)=ν ·
u (e + b1)
u (e − αt1)
(28)
This optimality condition has the same format as the decentralized optimality condition (14)
and can be solved in a similar manner. In particular, the equilibrium condition (28) deﬁnes a
function bSP
1 :( 0 ,νmax,SP]×[Amin,A max] → (−e,Amint1 +smax] that satisﬁes ∂bSP
1 /∂νSP > 0
and ∂bSP
1 /∂A1 ≥ 0. The maximum value of νSP for which the function is deﬁned is νSP,max =
[ ¯ A2/qmin − ηqf]/(1 − ηqf) ·
u(e−αt1)
u(e+Amin
1 t1+smax) >ν DE,max, since the planner perceives a higher
shadow cost of ﬁre-selling all of the banker’s assets than decentralized bankers.
Observe that expression (28) reduces to the optimality condition of decentralized bankers
(14) when there are no ﬁre sales and
¯ A2
q(b1−A1t1) = 1. In comparing the planner’s repayment
function bSP
1 (·) and the decentralized repayment function bDE
1 (·) we ﬁnd









for ν ≤ ˆ ν(A1)
bSP
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A detailed proof is given in appendix A.4. Intuitively, if ν is low enough that the corre-
sponding repayment can be made without incurring binding constraints, the planner and
decentralized agents value liquidity equally and repay identical amounts. If the repayment
requires ﬁre-sales, the planner values liquidity more highly and repays less for a given shadow
cost of raising period 0 funds. Furthermore, as Aω
1 decreases, the planner decreases repay-
ments more rapidly than decentralized agents.
Proposition 4 (Planner’s Solution Under Loose Constraints) If αt1 ∈ [0, ˆ R0], i.e.
if the decentralized equilibrium exhibits loose constraints in all states of nature, then the
decentralized equilibrium coincides with the planner’s optimal allocation.
Proof. Consider an economy that satisﬁes condition (20) so that the decentralized equi-
librium exhibits loose constraints across all states of nature. In period 1, aω,DE ≥ 0 ∀ω,
therefore both decentralized agents and the banker ﬁnd it optimal to not engage in ﬁre sales,
but to allocate the banker’s net liquid assets to consumption cω
1,b = aω. Furthermore, the
utility of second generation households is at the level that they receive in the decentralized
equilibrium, so the planner does not need to compensate them and T ω
1 =0 .
Note that the marginal valuations of period 1 liquidity of decentralized bankers and
of the planner coincide for this allocation, i.e. μω,DE = μω,SP = 1 for net liquid assets
aω,DE. Therefore the optimality conditions on bω
1 in the decentralized equilibrium (14) and
in the planner’s optimum (28) coincide and the decentralized allocation satisﬁes the planner’s
optimality conditions for ν∗SP = ν∗DE. Note that in the given allocation, household utility
is at the level of the decentralized equilibrium and the planner ﬁnds it optimal to set the
period 0 transfer to T0 =0 .
Proposition 5 (Planner’s Solution Under Partially Binding Constraints) If αt1 ∈
( ˆ R0,R max
0 ], i.e. if the decentralized equilibrium exhibits binding constraints in some states of
nature, then the planner achieves a Pareto improvement over the decentralized equilibrium.
The planner’s allocation is described by a shadow price ν∗SP >ν ∗DE and a productivity
threshold for binding constraints ˆ ASP
1 > ˆ ADE
1 such that:
• For Aω
1 ≥ ˆ ASP
1 , the planner contracts a higher ﬁxed repayment bω
1 = bunc
1 (ν∗SP)= ˆ ASP
1 t1
than decentralized bankers and there are no ﬁre sales.
• For Aω
1 < ˆ ASP
1 , the planner chooses repayments below ˆ ASP
1 t1 and makes smaller pay-




1 in the lowest states of nature.27
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Figure 5: Comparison of repayment bω
1 for decentralized bankers and planner
Proof. Let us rewrite the constraint USP ≥ UDE guaranteeing that ﬁrst generation house-
holds are not worse oﬀ in the planner’s allocation:
E[u(e + b
SP




By lemma 2 the inequality would be violated for ν = ν∗DE. Since the left-hand side of the
inequality is strictly increasing in ν, the constraint is satisﬁed with equality for the optimal







1) and that the threshold for binding constraints ˆ ASP
1 = bunc
1 (ν∗SP)/t1 rises.
Since equation (29) must hold with equality, higher repayments in all unconstrained





The third equation of lemma 2 reveals that bSP
1 (·) rises faster in A1 than bDE
1 (·)f o rag i v e n
ν. It follows that the planner repays less than decentralized agents in those states of nature
with the lowest realizations of productivity Aω
1, i.e. in which there are the greatest ﬁre sales.
The payments {b
ω,SP





1 ] than those chosen in the decentralized equilibrium – in fact this price
signal is the reason why decentralized agents purchase less insurance against constrained
states. The planner’s allocation satisﬁes the optimization problem (25) if she chooses a




1 ] − αt1 as determined by equation (27).
Figure 5 illustrates the diﬀerences between the repayments contracted by decentralized
bankers and by the planner graphically. For a low initial investment requirement bankers
make a ﬁxed repayment bunc
1 and do not experience binding constraints – the two equilibria
coincide. For a high initial investment requirement the planner repays more in unconstrained
states and less in most constrained states of nature compared to bankers.
Remark 1: The planner reallocates period 1 repayments bω
1 from strongly constrained28
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states to unconstrained states of nature in order to reduce socially ineﬃcient ﬁre sales and
output declines. The planner therefore purchases more ‘insurance’ against low output states
that exhibit binding constraints. In practice, this could be interpreted as substituting debt
ﬁnance by other, more contingent forms of ﬁnance.
Remark 2: In the described economy, the aggregate productivity shock Aω
1 constitutes
systematic risk. Whenever ﬁnancial constraints are binding, ampliﬁcation eﬀects are trig-
gered and the shock triggers systemic risk, which bankers would like to insure against. First
generation households are risk-averse and require compensation for taking on this risk, and
the decentralized equilibrium is therefore characterized by the privately optimal trade-oﬀ
between the cost of consumption volatility for households and the eﬃciency cost of ﬁre-sales
for bankers. However, since decentralized bankers internalize only part of the social beneﬁt
of insuring against ﬁre-sales, they leave themselves exposed to too much systemic risk. As
a result, the economy is characterized by an excessive extent of ﬁnancial ampliﬁcation and
excessive declines in asset prices and output in low states of nature.
We emphasized in propositions 2 and 5 that systemic risk and socially excessive ﬁre sales
arise whenever the initial investment requirement of bankers is so high that it is optimal
to incur some ﬁre sales in low states of nature (αt1 > ˆ R0), as captured by condition (20).
Let us discuss the circumstances that determine whether this condition is likely to be satis-
ﬁed. Assume for simplicity that the utility function of ﬁrst-generation households exhibits
constant relative risk aversion θ.
Corollary 1 (Incidence of Systemic Risk) The economy is more prone to systemic risk,
i.e. condition (20) is more likely to be violated,
• the higher the initial ﬁnancing requirement αt1 of bankers
• the lower the endowment of ﬁrst-generation households
• the lower the minimum period 1 return of bankers Amint1
• the greater the relative risk aversion of households θ.
5 Applications
Having analytically characterized the externality that is the subject of this paper, we turn
our attention to a number of applications, including the eﬀects of anticipated government
bailouts, the implementation of the planner’s solution via macroprudential regulation, and
the suboptimal incentives for bankers to raise new capital in states of systemic ampliﬁcation.29
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5.1 Bailout Neutrality
When binding constraints and ﬁnancial ampliﬁcation in an economy are triggered, gov-
ernment authorities ﬁnd it ex post optimal to intervene by providing lump-sum transfers
(‘bailouts’) to constrained bankers. This allows them to mitigate the ampliﬁcation eﬀects
and the associated decline in asset prices and output. This section shows that if such bailout
transfers are anticipated, decentralized bankers will ﬁnd it optimal to fully undo them.
Assume that a government commits to a state-contingent period 1 lump-sum transfer
Zω that provides a bailout Zω > 0 to bankers in states of nature in which they experience
binding constraints. If bankers are unconstrained, government levys a fee Zω < 0o nt h e m
so as to make the policy revenue-neutral in expectation. Assume that the government buys
the respective state contingent securities from ﬁrst generation households at time 0 and
distributes the transfers to bankers in period 1 after the productivity shock is realized. The






If we add these transfers to the optimization problems of bankers and ﬁrst-generation
households, their ﬁrst order conditions are unaﬀected: decentralized bankers chose their
equilibrium allocations on the basis of an optimal tradeoﬀ of risk versus return. If they
receive one more dollar in period 1 of a given state ω, they will sell one more bond contingent
on that state so as to restore their privately optimal equilibrium.
Proposition 6 (Bailout Neutrality) An anticipated state-contingent lump sum transfer
Zω to bankers that satisﬁes E[mω
1Zω] will be fully undone by optimizing bankers.








This implies that – after the transfer has occured – all other allocations and prices in the
economy are identical to those of the decentralized equilibrium. Our ﬁnding represents a
state-contingent form of Ricardian equivalence (Barro, 1974). Bankers see through the ﬁscal
veil and add up their private budget constraint and the government’s transfers Zω when
determining their optimal decisions.
Remark 1: The proposition also suggests circumstances under which bailouts may be
eﬀective. This may be the case if (a) they are unanticipated or (b) if bankers are prevented
from undoing the transfers, either because of regulatory constraints or because the state-
contingent markets required for this do not exist.30
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Remark 2: Transfers in constrained states that were anticipated but that end up not taking
place can have strongly negative eﬀects, since any exogenous change Δa to the liquidity
position of bankers under binding constraints is ampliﬁed. The expectation of a bailout leads
bankers to take on larger risks than what is privately optimal in the absence of government
intervention; their liquidity position after the shock is therefore below what is privately
optimal, and by implication even further below what is socially optimal.
Our bailout neutrality result captures a stark version of what is sometimes described as
the ‘moral hazard’ introduced by the anticipation of government bailouts. In the described
setting, private bankers ﬁnd it optimal to engage in socially excessive risk-taking if there are
some states of nature in which ﬁnancial constraints are binding. Even if bailouts are lump-
sum and do not distort the marginal incentives of bankers as captured by their optimality
conditions, they ﬁnd it optimal to undo them in order to return to their privately optimal
allocations. This suggests that in the given setting, lump sum transfers cannot improve upon
the allocations of the decentralized equilibrium in an ex-ante sense.
5.2 Macroprudential Regulation
In this section, we examine how a planner can implement Pareto superior allocations by
resorting to a tax on risk-taking that brings the private costs of risk-taking in line with the
social cost. We call this measure “macroprudential regulation” because it closely captures
what the Bank for International Settlements deﬁnes as the macroprudential approach to
regulation (see e.g. Borio, 2003): it is designed to limit system-wide ﬁnancial distress that
stems from the correlated exposure of ﬁnancial institutions and to avoid the resulting real
output losses in the economy.
Deﬁnition 1 (Externality Kernel) We deﬁne the externality kernel τω of bankers as the





This captures the un-internalized social cost of ﬁnancially constrained bankers making a
payment of one dollar in state ω. Following proposition 3, the externality kernel is zero in
unconstrained states and positive in constrained states. Since the productivity shock Aω
1 is
the only source of uncertainty in the model and since lower realizations of productivity are
associated with tighter constraints, we ﬁnd Cov(τω,A ω
1) < 0 whenever there are states with
binding constraints.
We observed from equation (28) that the decentralized solution and the planner’s allo-
cation in period 0 diﬀer only to the extent that their respective valuations of liquidity diﬀer31
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in constrained states of nature, with the diﬀerence captured by the externality kernel. By
raising the private valuation to the social valuation of liqudity in all states of nature, a
state-contingent tax on the issuance of Arrow securities allows the planner to replicate this
allocation in a market setting.
Proposition 7 (Macroprudential Taxation) A planner who imposes a state-contingent
proportional tax τω on the issuance of Arrow securities bω
1 in period 0 restores constrained
social eﬃciency. Compensatory transfers T0 and T ω
1 as deﬁned in (22) and (27) ensure that
the resulting allocation constitutes a Pareto improvement.
To move our discussion from Arrow securities to more complex ﬁnancial securities, assume
that the economy is in the equilibrium described in the previous proposition and consider an
atomistic banker who sells a unit of a ﬁnancial claim in period 0 that has a state-contingent
net payoﬀ proﬁle Xω in period 1. Such a claim can be viewed as a collection of Arrow
securities with weights Xω. It can be interpreted alternatively as an investment in risky
assets that is ﬁnanced by uncontingent debt and yields a net payoﬀ of Xω.
Corollary 2 (Taxation of Complex Securities) The externalities imposed by a ﬁnan-
cial payoﬀ Xω are E[τωXω]. The optimal period 0 tax that induces a banker to internalize










To gain some intuition, let us compare the magnitude of the externalities imposed by
a number of securities with diﬀerent payoﬀ proﬁles. Figure 6 schematically depicts a few
examples. First, for an uncontingent bond with a face value of one dollar, the payoﬀs are
Xω = 1 in all constrained and unconstrained states of nature. The optimal tax on such a
bond is E[τω].
Next consider a risky security with an expected payoﬀ E[Xω] of one dollar. The exter-
nality imposed by such a security is E[τω]+Cov(τω,Xω). If the payoﬀ Xω of a security and
the externality kernel have positive covariance, then the security imposes larger externalities
and embodies more systemic risk than an uncontingent bond, and therefore calls for greater
macroprudential taxation. A stark example would be a credit default swap, which is likely to
require large payouts precisely in times of ﬁnancial turmoil, i.e. when economy-wide ﬁnancial
constraints bind and when the externality kernel τω is high.8
8The payoﬀ proﬁle drawn in ﬁgure 6 is not based on a speciﬁc analytical example but illustrates the
assumption that defaults in the economy occur when the banking sector as a whole experience binding
constraints.32
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Figure 6: Schematic payoﬀ proﬁle of uncontingent bond, equity and credit default swap
On the other hand, the more negatively the payoﬀs Xω of a security covary with the
externality kernel, the more insurance the state-contingent payoﬀ provides, the smaller the
externality and the lower the optimal tax. An example would be if bankers sell equity paying
dividends that are linear in the state of productivity Aω
1, which is by construction negatively
correlated with τω. Note that the optimal tax τ∗
X is not bounded at zero. If a security oﬀers
suﬃcient systemic insurance beneﬁts, i.e. it provides positive payoﬀs to bankers precisely
when they are constrained and subject to ﬁnancial ampliﬁcation eﬀects, then it imposes
a positive systemic externality and should be subject to a subsidy, or a reduction in the
capital that banks are required to hold. An example would be a credit default swap that
shifts systemic risk to agents outside of the ﬁnancial system who are not subject to ﬁnancial
constraints.
Equivalent Capital Adequacy Requirements While we have formulated our policy
measures in terms of taxes, banking regulations typically take the form of capital adequacy
requirements, which have tax-like eﬀects since bank capital is costly. If the opportunity cost
of holding one dollar of capital is δ for a bank, then a tax τ∗
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Macro- vs. Micro-Prudential Regulation Equation (31) captures that what matters
for macroprudential regulation is not the general riskiness inherent in a security, as described
e.g. by the variance of its payoﬀ, but rather the correlation with systemic risk, as described
by its covariance with the externality kernel τω. This is commonly viewed to be an important
feature of macroprudential regulation (Borio, 2003).
Leverage Leverage multiplies gains or losses by using uncontingent debt to increase the
amount invested in a risky security. For example, if a risky investment with payoﬀ Xω in
period 1 is leveraged by a factor α>1, then (α−1) units are ﬁnanced by debt and the total
payoﬀ is
αX






1Xω] is the period 0 price of the investment and 1
E[mω
1 ] is the risk-free interest rate.
This amounts to an increase in the dispersion of the total payoﬀ by a factor α, which raises
its covariance with the externality kernel in equation (31) equiproportionally and increases
the externalities of the investment accordingly.
Reach of Regulation Our theory also oﬀers insights into the question about the reach of
regulation: macroprudential regulation should apply to any ﬁnancial market participant who
might potentially be forced to engage in ﬁre-sales during periods of system-wide ampliﬁcation
eﬀects, since a rational private actor would not internalize the price eﬀects of such sales and
the externalities on the ﬁnancing constraints of other market participants. This includes
hedge funds and other actors in the so-called “shadow ﬁnancial system.”
Socially Risk-Neutral Probabilities Pricing kernels can alternatively be represented as
a risk-neutral probability measure that weighs states against which agents are risk-averse
more highly. We can apply a similar transformation to the social planner’s pricing kernel.
If regulators instruct banks to employ the regulator’s risk-neutral probabilities in their risk
management systems, the externality that is the topic of this paper would be alleviated.





and the social value of a payoﬀ Xω can be expressed as Ern[Xω], where Ern[·] represents
the expectations operator under the socially risk-neutral probability measure deﬁned by frn.
This measure weighs states of the world in which ampliﬁcation eﬀects arise more highly than
what would be indicated by a traditional ‘privately’ risk-neutral probability measure, which
in turn assigns more weight to such states than the objective probability of that state.34
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Market Discipline It has been argued that transparency requirements in conjunction
with the market discipline embodied by pillar 3 of the Basel accord would induce banks to
optimally smooth their capital position throughout the business cycle (see e.g. Gordy and
Howells, 2006, for a discussion of this argument). In the absence of regulations of systemic
externalities, our analysis suggests that markets would actually punish prudent banks that
behave socially responsibly and would reward banks that take on socially excessive risks,
since maximizing shareholder value involves excessive risk-taking.
5.3 Raising New Capital
Next we extend our model of the previous sections to study the incentives for bankers to
raise capital. Suppose we introduce an audit technology that gives bankers a way around
the pledgeability problem for period 2 payoﬀs. Speciﬁcally, assume that second-generation
households can take ownership of a fraction γ of bankers’ period 2 returns as long as they
pay a convex auditing cost c(γ)i np e r i o d1 ,w h e r ec(0) = c (0) = 0 and c (γ),c   (γ) > 0f o r
γ>0. Since they are risk-neutral, they are willing to provide γ ¯ A2(t1 − f1) − c(γ)i nr e t u r n
for their ownership share.
The resulting version of the period 1 problem (10) of a decentralized banker is
V (a)= m a x
{c1,b,f1,γ}
c1,b +( 1− γ) ¯ A2(t1 − f1) − μ

c1,b − a − q1f1 − γ ¯ A2(t1 − f1)+c(γ)

+ λc1,b
Similarly, total period 1 surplus S(a) can be formulated by modifying the planner’s problem
(23) analogously. For both private bankers and the planner, the optimality condition with





¯ A2(t1 − f1)
	
As we observed in proposition 3, μDE = μSP = 1 if the economy is unconstrained, implying
that bankers and the planner will not raise new capital in period 1 and γ = 0. This is
because raising new equity is not useful to relax liquidity constraints, but is costly because
of the monitoring technology.
If the economy experiences binding constraints, μSP >μ DE > 1, and the optimality
condition implies that γSP >γ DE > 0. A planner values liquidity more highly than de-
centralized agents and is therefore more willing than bankers to pay auditing costs to raise
new equity. She internalizes that in doing so, she not only relaxes the constraint of the
banker who obtains liquidity, but also pushes up the asset price at which all other bankers
are ﬁre-selling.35
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Proposition 8 A social planner would sell a higher equity stake γSP >γ DE than decentral-
ized bankers in states of binding constraints so as to mitigate ﬁnancial ampliﬁcation eﬀects.
Remark: The fundamental diﬀerence between ﬁre sales and raising new equity in our
example is that ﬁre sales lead to aggregate price declines, which entail pecuniary externalities
on other agents, whereas equity issuance entails private costs to bankers that do not have
external eﬀects.
6 Conclusions
Financial markets are inherently pro-cyclical – ﬁnancing constraints endogenously loosen in
good times and tighten in bad times, and this phenomenon can entail ﬁnancial ampliﬁcation
eﬀects: in case of a negative aggregate shocks, bankers experience binding borrowing con-
straints, which may require them to cut back on their economic activity by selling some of
their asset holdings. This depresses asset prices, deteriorates their balance sheets, leads to
tighter ﬁnancing conditions, requires further ﬁre sales etc.
This paper demonstrate that such ﬁnancial ampliﬁcation eﬀects introduce an externality
into the economy that leads individual bankers to undervalue liquidity in crisis states. Small
agents take asset prices – and the tightness of ﬁnancing conditions – as given and do not
internalize the general equilibrium eﬀects of their actions on prices and constraints. In
particular, they do not internalize that ﬁre sales during crises depress asset prices, which
trigger ampliﬁcation eﬀects that hurt other bankers in the economy.
The undervaluation of liquidity in crisis times in turn leads bankers to take on excessive
risk and buy insuﬃcient insurance in their ﬁnancing decisions, and to undervalue the beneﬁts
of raising new capital in crises. While we have limited our analysis to the ﬁnancing decisions
of bankers in the initial period, the externality would also lead to excessive real investment
in projects that create exposure to systemic risk, as highlighted e.g. by Lorenzoni (2008).
Our paper develops a stylized model that allows us to analytically examine these ineﬃ-
ciencies and investigate related policy measure. In our model, liquidity shortages in period
1 lead to ﬁre sales, but there is no debt carried from period 1 to period 2. There are two
directions along which our setup of ﬁnancial constraints could be extended. First, in inﬁnite
horizon models of ﬁnancial ampliﬁcation such as Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), falling asset
price also reduce the value of collateral and lower the amount of debt that can be carried
forward through a ‘dynamic multiplier’ eﬀect. This is explored in Jeanne and Korinek (2010)
for the case of uncontingent ﬁnancial contracts. Second, as emphasized e.g. by Geanakoplos36
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1345
June 2011
(2009), changes in ﬁnancial conditions are also reﬂected in endogenous changes in lever-
age. Both eﬀects are likely to further strenghthen the externalities of ﬁnancial ampliﬁcation
eﬀects.37
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Assumption A.1 The parameters of the economy satisfy the following conditions:
1. αt1 ∈ (0,R max
0 ] where the ceiling Rmax
0 = R0(νmax) as deﬁned in (18)
2. Amaxt1 ≤ smax = F  (t1)t1
Part 1. of the assumption guarantees that the initial investment requirement αt1 is low
enough that it can be ﬁnanced by borrowing from ﬁrst generation households. Speciﬁcally,
the assumption guarantees that the shadow price of liquidity ν lies within an interval (0,νmax]
for which the optimal repayment function b1(ν;Aω
1) is deﬁned for all ω ∈ Ω. For a larger
initial investment requirement, bankers would run into one of the following problems: either
ν>¯ ν(Amin), which implies that they commit to repayments that they cannot meet in low
states of nature even if they ﬁre-sell their entire asset holdings; or ν>ˆ ν(Amax), which implies
that their initial investment requirement is so large that they will have to ﬁre-sell assets in
all states of nature in period 1.
We could relax this assumption somewhat by imposing an explicit constraint on ﬁre sales
fω
1 ≤ t1 and by including equilibria with binding constraints across all states of nature in
our analysis, but this would not aﬀect the main results of our analysis.
Point 2. implies that the collateral of bankers in period 1 valued at the lowest possible
ﬁre-sale price is suﬃcient to back up their maximum ﬁnancial promise Amaxt1 in the highest
state of nature in an equilibrium with partially binding constraints. It follows by implication
that the collateral of bankers is suﬃcient to back up all equilibrium promises {bω
1} in all
states of nature. The marginal product F  (t1) captures the marginal payoﬀ of the asset
for period 2, which represents all future periods of the economy, whereas Amax captures the
maximum payoﬀ for period 1 only. The condition is therefore likely to be satisﬁed in practice.
If there were binding constraints on bω
1 for some ω, we would have to explicitly account for
this constraint in our analysis, but the main results of our paper would still hold.
A.2 First Generation Households
Assumption A.2 The degree of relative risk aversion R(c) of ﬁrst generation households
satisﬁes
(Amax + ¯ A2)t1
e +( Amax + ¯ A2)t1
· R(c) < 1 ∀ c
Note that (Amax + ¯ A2)t1 is an upper bound on what entrepreneurs can aﬀord to repay
to households in period 1 if they obtain the maximum possible output shock and ﬁre-sell
all of their assets at the maximum possible price ¯ A2; therefore the contracted repayment
bω
1 ≤ (Amax + ¯ A2)t1 and household consumption cω
1 ≤ e +( Amax + ¯ A2)t1 ∀ω.40
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The purpose of assumption A.2 is to ensure that the amount raised by Arrow securities
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The assumption is satisﬁed if the product of relative risk aversion and debt is suﬃciently
low. For the standard value of relative risk aversion used in macroeconomics R =2t h e
assumption holds as long as the debt repayment received by households in period 1 makes
up less than half of their consumption. This is plausible since approximately two thirds of
household income derives from wages.
If the assumption was violated, then the amount of ﬁnance raised mω
1bω
1 would fall as the
promised repayment bω
1 rises because the pricing kernel of consumers mω
1 would fall faster
than bω
1 increases. In such a situation, the economy may be subject to multiple equilibria,
since diﬀerent amounts of promised repayments could lead to the same amount of ﬁnance
raised.
A.3 Second Generation Households








f1 · F   (f1)
F  (f)
< 1( A . 1 )
This assumption is satisﬁed for most regular production functions. It guarantees that





  (ff) > 0
If this assumption was violated, there would be multiple levels of ﬁre sales that would raise
a given amount of liquidity.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 2
The ﬁrst part of lemma 2 holds since q(·)= ¯ A2 and the left-hand side of (28) reduces to 1 if
ν<ˆ ν(A1), thereby coinciding with the decentralized optimality condition (15).





(1 − η)=ν ·
u (e + b1)
u (e − αt1)
(A.2)
and denote ˜ b1(ν;A1,η) as the solution to this implicit equation in b1. Observe that equation
(A.2) reduces to the decentralized optimality condition (15) if we set η =0a n dt ot h e
planner’s optimality condition (28) if we set η = ηqf. The function ˜ b1(A1,ν,η) is continuous41
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in η for η ≤ 1. Applying the implicit function theorem we ﬁnd that ∂˜ b1(ν;A1,η)/∂η < 0
for ν>ˆ ν(A1) since q(·) < ¯ A2 in that case. Fixing (ν,A1) and going from η = 0 in (15) to
η = ηqf > 0 in (28) therefore implies that the solutions to the implicit equations have to
satisfy bSP
1 (ν;A1) <b DE
1 (ν;A1). Similarly, we determine that ∂2˜ b1(ν;A1,η)/∂η∂A1 < 0f o r
ν>ˆ ν(A1), which conﬁrms the last part of the lemma.Working PaPer SerieS
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